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Abstract—Failure injection in distributed systems has been an
important issue to experiment with robust, resilient distributed
systems. In order to reproduce real-life conditions, parts of the
application must be killed without letting the operating system
close the existing network communications in a ”clean” way.
When a process is simply killed, the OS closes them. SystemTap is
a an infrastructure that probes the Linux kernel’s internal calls. If
processes are killed at kernel-level, they can be destroyed without
letting the OS do anything else. In this paper, we present a kernel-
level failure injection system based on SystemTap. We present
how it can be used to implement deterministic and probabilistic
failure scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Failure injection in distributed systems has been an im-
portant issue to experiment with robust, resilient distributed
systems. People who develop fault-tolerant applications must
be able to test their software in faulty conditions, i.e.,, with
realistic failures. For instance, the fault-tolerant implementa-
tion of the MPI standard MPICH-V [2] aims at providing an
execution environment that can survive failures. It was tested
using a failure-injection system and a specific fault scenario
exhibited a rare bug in a precise situation of two consecutive
failures [10]. This tool helped the developers of MPICH-V
finding out this bug and, more important, fixing it.
In a similar way, failure detectors need to be strained and
tested in real-life situations [1]. Traditional failure injection
tools kill processes. However, when a process is killed, the
operating system of the machine closes all the network and
system sockets in a “clean” way. For instance, all the TCP con-
nections are closed according to the TCP protocol. However,
this is not a realistic situation. In real life, most failures follow
the fail-stop semantics: when a component fails, it simply stops
doing anything [14], [15]. The crashed component can be a
process or a communication channel. The cause of this failure
can be an electric failure, a cable cut, a scheduling bug... In
any case, the failed component behaves normally and then
halts. As a matter of fact, no warning is issued before the crash
happens. As a consequence, the operating system cannot close
the sockets nor any such thing.
In this paper, we present a method to inject failures in appli-
cations at kernel-level; therefore, the operating system cannot
interfere with the application and the sockets are not closed.
Our approach is based on two Linux tools: SystemTap and
control groups (cgroups). We also explain how this approach
can be extended to other crash semantics, such as replication
and omission of network packets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we present and analyze existing failure injection
systems, and we compare them with our approach. In section
III, we present our approach for Failure Injection with Sys-
temTap (FIST), and how it can be used to inject failures in
distributed applications. In section IV, we explain how failure
scenarios are implemented in practice with FIST. Last, we
conclude the presentation of this approach and we mention
perspectives for other kinds of failures in section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
Faults injection in parallel computing is more trick than
in common distributed systems. Developers can use a virtual
HPC infrastructure to check fault resilience of parallel code
running on top of parallelisation libraries (OpenMPI, OpenMP
etc.) [9]. The libraries used for parallel computing are closely
related to hardware. For example, when Open MPI’s run-
time daemon orted is started, it selects a network medium
(Ethernet, InfiniBand, etc.) to perform communication between
MPI processes. Network media like Infiniband cannot be
virtualized.
In [11], a daemon process is used on each node to apply
a fault injection policy in the instrumented processes. This
approach introduces additional processes on the host. Those
processes interfere with kernel scheduler in two ways:
1) it consumes resources, such as CPU cycles and schedul-
ing quanta;
2) more processes need to be handled by the scheduling
policy.
The scheduler behavior should not be altered by the fault
injection infrastructure in parallel computing libraries. For
example, parallel computing libraries like OpenMP [7] interact
with scheduler to optimize process affinity with CPU caches
etc [3]. Moreover, if a fault injection daemon fails, the policy
becomes inapplicable.
III. FAILURE INJECTION
In common-Linux based systems, a running process is a
kernel structure task_struct. This structure defines an
integer variable pid and a pointer to another task_struct.
The pid is used by the kernel to identify the process in a non-
ambiguous way. The pointer refers the parent task_struct.
2To put it another way, it refers to the father process that
performed the fork/exec sequence to spawn the child process.
As a consequence, Linux process organization can be seen as
a tree with the initd process as a root.
Control groups (Cgroups) are a major evolution of this
model. Without cgroups, resource usage policy can only be
defined for a targeted process and its potential childs. Cgroups
allow to add a process dynamicalle to one or more groups at
each creation of a task_struct. Such a group is called
a cgroup. Resource usage policy can target a cgroup instead
of a single process. Cgroups make it possible to apply the
same resource usage policy on a group of processes without
wondering about the process tree structure.
Cgroups are always used with a new improvement of
Linux kernel: name spaces. Name spaces make it possible to
have different instances of some kernel objects. This provides
powerful isolation capabilities to Linux kernels. For instances,
processes that belong to a given cgroup can use their own
instance of the IP stack. These two components allow to run
a lightweight sandbox under a strict resource limitation policy
[13].
A. SystemTap
SystemTap is a production-ready kernel auditing tool. An
audit policy is written in a high-level language. The main
part of the policy consist in definitions of probes. A probe is
an instrumentation point of the kernel (for example, a kernel
function). Systemtap relies on two kinds of probes: Kprobes
and Jprobes. Kprobes can trap at almost any kernel code
address and define a handler to execute code when the address
is reached. A Kprobe can be attached to any instruction in
the kernel. Jprobes are inserted at a kernel function’s entry,
providing a convenient access to its arguments.
Systemtap provides a compiler that transforms an auditing
policy to a loadable kernel module. When loaded, this kernel
module registers all the defined probes. Every time a probed
function is reached, the defined handler code is executed. Han-
dler codes can use SystemTap’s native collection of functions
or a guru mode. SystemTap’s native functions are high-level
primitives implemented in tapsets (quite similar to libraries).
The guru mode enables to pass rough C kernel code to handler
code.
B. Process supervision and control
Process supervision consists in collecting states and met-
rics about a targeted process. Control consist in performing
actions on a supervised process. Prior to the introduction of
cgroups in the Linux kernel, common “master” processes were
used to supervise and control child processes. The two main
drawbacks of this model are the following ones:
1) if the master process fails, every supervised child process
also fails. To mitigate this issue, the master’s source code
should be very short;
2) a process can belong to only one supervision domain,
since it has only one father.
C. Running distributed applications on FIST
The idea behind FIST can be summarized as follows:
• a specific control group is defined for processes that
belong to the experiment; these are the processes that
can be affected by intentional failures.
• a SystemTap script inserts a hook in the kernel’s sched-
uler. When the scheduler is invoked to run a process, it
checks whether this process belongs to the experimental
cgroup. If it does, the failure injection scenario is fol-
lowed to decide whether the process must be run normally
or killed.
In practice, a process can be executed in a given cgroup
by using the command cgexec. For instance, the command
sleep can be executed in the cgroup xp on all the mounted
controllers using the following command:
cgexec -g *:xp sleep 1
Distributed applications are often made of two parts: the
run-time environment, and the application processes them-
selves. In the case of MPI programs, the application is
supported by a distributed run-time environment which is
made of a set of processes (one on each machine used by
the computation) that are spawning, supporting and monitoring
the application processes on their machine [6], [4]. The failure
detector is usually implemented in this run-time environment.
As a consequence, the processes of the run-time environment
are the ones that need to be executed in the experimental
cgroup. For instance, Open MPI [8] can be specified on
the command-line which command must be used to start its
run-time environment’s daemons (called orted). In order to
execute these daemons in the cgroup xp on all the mounted
controllers, the mpiexec command can receive the following
option:
--mca orte_launch_agent ’cgexec -g *:xp orted’
Otherwise, if we want to run the application processes in
the aforementioned control group, the parallel program can be
executed by the cgexec command:
mpiexec -n 5 cgexec -g *:xp mpiprogram
IV. IMPLEMENTING FAILURE SCENARIOS WITH
SYSTEMTAP
In this section, we present how failure scenarios can be
implemented using SystemTap. We give two examples: a
deterministic scenario (section IV-A) and a probabilistic one
(section IV-B).
A process can be killed at kernel-level by canceling it (and
freeing it) from the scheduler. When the kernel is about to
schedule a process, it calls the context_switch function.
As explained in section III-A, a Jprobe can be inserted when
this function is entered. Then, we can see which control group
the process belongs to (see section III and, based on the failure
scenario, decide to kill or not the process.
In figure 1 we give an example of a C function that can be
compiled by SystemTap to find out which cgroup a process
belongs to. Based on the unique pid of the process, the
task_cgroup function gets the cgroup of this given task.
3function find_cgroup:string(task:long) %{
struct cgroup *cgrp;
struct task_struct *tsk = (struct task_struct *)((long)THIS->task);
/* Initialize with an empty value */
strcpy(THIS->__retvalue, "NULL");
cgrp = task_cgroup(tsk, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id);
if (cgrp)
cgroup_path(cgrp, THIS->__retvalue, MAXSTRINGLEN);
%}
Fig. 1. Finding out which cgroup a process belongs to.
SystemTap modules can call functions defined in the kernel.
Hence, the free_task function can be called to cancel and
free a process at the moment when it is about to be scheduled.
We give an example of a piece of code that kills a process
calling this function from a SystemTap module in figure 2.
Therefore, the process is canceled by the scheduler, but the
operating system cannot do anything else. The I/O structures
(e.g., network sockets) remain open, like with any real-life
failure.
A. Deterministic failure scenarios
We can imagine the following deterministic failure scenario:
after a certain time TIMEOUT, the process is killed. Hence,
whenever the process is about to be scheduled, the SystemTap
module needs to determine for how long it has been run-
ning. This information can be obtained from a field of the
task_struct data structure used by the kernel (see section
III for more information). On recent versions of the Linux
kernel, a tapset function provides this information.
Figure 3 gives an excerpt of what can be used by SystemTap.
The two functions task_stime_ and task_utime_ return
respectively the system time and the user time spent by
the process, obtained from the internal task_struct data
structure. When the context_switch function is called,
the module finds out which cgroup the process to be scheduled
belongs to. If it belongs to the xp cgroup, the process is
concerned by failure injection. The module finds out for how
long the process has been running. If it has been running for
longer than TIMEOUT, the process is killed.
B. Probabilistic failure scenarios
We can imagine the following probabilistic failure scenario:
every time a process is scheduled, it has one chance out of two
(likelihood of 50%) to be killed. Hence, whenever the process
is about to be scheduled, the SystemTap module generates a
random number in [0, 2[, and if this number is larger or equal
to 1, then the process is killed.
Figure 4 gives an excerpt of what can be used by SystemTap.
When the context_switch function is called, the module
finds out which cgroup the process to be scheduled belongs to.
If it belongs to the xp cgroup, SystemTap generates a random
integer in [0, 2[ using the function randint. If this integer
is larger or equal to 1, the process is killed.
probe kernel.function("context_switch") {
cgroup = find_cgroup($next)
if ( cgroup == "/xp" ){
r = randint( 2 )
if( r >= 1 ) {
skip_task( $next )
}
}
}
Fig. 4. Probabilistic failure injection scenario: every time it is about to be
scheduled, the process has a certain probability to be killed.
V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
In this paper, we have presented FIST, a failure-injection
technique that takes advantage of recent Linux kernel features,
namely, cgroups and SystemTap. This technique injects highly
realistic failures, taking advantage of the fact that it kills
processes directly in the kernel’s task scheduler, making them
die without notice. We have presented a method to use it to
implement deterministic and probabilistic failure scenarios.
A. Limitations and how they can be overcome
The major limitation of this approach is that the System-
Tap module must, of course, be executed with super-user
privileges. This can be overcome by two approaches. The
most generic one is to use sudo. The administrator of the
machine can allow it on the modprobe command only. As a
consequence, the only thing that users would be able to do is
to insert their modules on the kernel.
The other way is to work on an experimental testbed that
provides a deployment software such as Kadeploy [12], such
as the Grid’5000 platform [5]. Kadeploy allows users to deploy
their own system image on the nodes they have reserved and
therefore have (temporarily) their own root access on these
nodes.
B. Using this method to implement other failure models
In this work we have focused in fail-stop failures. However,
it can be easily extended to other semantics. For instance,
probes can be added in the network stack. Messages can be
dropped to inject omission failures, or sent twice to inject
duplication.
4function skip_task(task:long) %{
struct task_struct *tsk = (struct task_struct *)((long)THIS->task);
free_task( tsk );
%}
Fig. 2. Killing a process by freeing the corresponding task in the kernel’s scheduler.
function task_stime_:long(task:long){
if (task != 0)
return @cast(task, "task_struct", "kernel<linux/sched.h>")->stime;
else
return 0;
}
function task_utime_:long(task:long){
if (task != 0)
return @cast(task, "task_struct", "kernel<linux/sched.h>")->utime;
else
return 0;
}
probe kernel.function("context_switch") {
cgroup = find_cgroup($next)
if ( cgroup == "/xp" ){
t = task_stime_( $next ) + task_utime_( $next )
if( t > TIMEOUT ) {
skip_task( $next )
}
}
}
Fig. 3. Deterministic failure injection scenario: after a certain time TIMEOUT, the process is killed.
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